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Abstract
This study tests whether the rise of free trade agreements (FTAs) in East Asia since 2000 has been
an attempt to manage the growing complexity of trade both between members of that region and
each other, as well as between them and the rest of the world. The study uses a measure of
dependency based on GDP, as well as a measure of intraindustry trade as indicators. Descriptive
statistics showed that there were increases in both measures for most countries towards both the
region and the rest of the world during the period of 1995 and 2010. Moreover, inferential statistics
showed that only intraindustry trade for the Southeast Asian countries correlated with
comprehensiveness of the FTAs (as measured by number of WTO-plus provisions in the FTA). The
Northeast countries of China, Japan and South Korea were found to have higher numbers of both
FTAs and provisions within those agreements than would be expected, if the theory and the
indicators would hold. The study provides contributions both to the understanding of Asian
institutionalization as well as the methodological approaches available to test the neoliberal
institutionalist argument for FTAs.
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institutionalism
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Puzzle of Free Trade Agreements in East Asia
The second half of the 20th century has seen the remarkable economic rise of East Asia (World Bank
1993). This rise is unprecedented in history as it has brought hundreds of millions of people out of
poverty within the span of a few short decades. Within economics, this rise has prompted great
debate about the causes behind the growth and its implications for economic models generally.
Within political spheres it has prompted many to wonder about its implications for the balance of
power in the international system. There are many ways to interpret these changes, depending on
one's theoretical outlook. Some may view this as a largely positive affair, focusing on the great
welfare increases it brought with it, while others may view these changes with fear, foreseeing an
almost inevitable clash (Mearsheimer 2006). On the whole, these changes are confusing and hard to
interpret.
Until very recently, the governments of East Asia have largely avoided creating international
political-economic institutions. This however, has begun to change. Perhaps the first, and most
important of those changes within the Asian sphere, which has led to great interest and debate in the
academic literature, is the enormous rise of free trade agreements (FTAs) in Asia. Before 2000 there
were only a handful of FTAs in Asia, however, after 2000 FTA growth increased substantially,
putting Asia currently at the forefront of the world in FTA construction (Kawai and Wignaraja
2013). This change in policy has brought about great debate among scholars of the Asian region.
The explanations offered have however, to a large extent, downplayed the possibility that
economics were a motivating factor, favoring instead security or constructivist based explanations
(Aggarwal and Govella 2013; Dent 2013; Lee 2013; Ravenhill 2010; Hoadley 2007; Sally 2006). 
These arguments have often put focus on the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This
crisis, allegedly, taught leaders in Asia both that they could not rely on support from the outside
world – many were disgusted by their treatment by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Higgott
1998), as well as the fact that they could be so strongly affected by economic events elsewhere in
the world. This provoked a sense of togetherness which did not exist to the same degree previously
in East Asia. It would be mistaken though, to say that the arguments have completely neglected the
economic side. It has been argued that once bilateral FTAs begin to be signed, a sort of economic
domino effect can take over as countries and their corporations would fear being excluded from
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preferential trading schemes, thus incentivizing them to form FTAs in response, with a resultant
chain-reaction emerging, as the logic spreads within the international system (Baldwin 1993). 
In addition to this domino theory, FTAs being used to promote further trade, especially
within the southeast Asian countries, has been accepted as a possible factor leading to FTA growth
(Hamanaka 2012). However, what has been largely neglected is a strong examination of whether
growing economic interdependence, and the growing complexity of economic relationships in
general, could be a large factor in the growth of FTAs in Asia. This argument, which Hurrell (1995)
attributes to neoliberal institutionalism, although it is fairly common within liberal theoretical
frameworks generally,1 is that as economic interdependence increases, coordination problems
emerge which warrant management by government actors through the creation of institutions. This
could, indeed, be part of the explanation for the rise of FTAs in Asia. Examination of this possibility
has been largely absent from the literature (Hamanaka 2012). 
There have been a great number of studies on the effects of FTAs on interdependence (Petri,
Plummer and Zhai 2011; Ando and Urata 2007; Plummer and Wignaraja 2006), but there have been
very few on the role of interdependence in the construction of FTAs (Hamanaka 2012; Ravenhill
2010). Those few studies, moreover, which have attempted to assess the role that economic
interdependence may have played in the creation of these FTAs, have generally avoided looking at
individual levels of interdependence between countries, and instead have focused on regional-level
measures of integration. Thus, while some argue that regional economic integration has increased
(Kawai and Wignaraja 2013), which may lead to the construction of these FTAs, others have argued
that regional economic interdependence has actually stagnated (Ravenhill 2010), thus ruling out a
potential interdependence argument. In both cases though, FTA growth is seen as a regional affair.
There are several problems with this debate. Measures of economic interdependence at the
regional level neglect the reality that approximately 50% of the FTAs are signed with countries
outside of the region. Measuring the degree of regional inward-focused trading does not at all
answer the question of why there has been a parallel increase in both regional and global FTA
construction from Asia. While the growth of the FTAs may be related to regionalism, it is a mistake
to purely analyze the issue as if it is only regional in nature. Moreover, by using region-wide
measures, individual country differences in levels of interdependence as well as FTA strategies are
neglected. Despite being relatively understudied, analyzing the economic precursors to FTA
creation can provide great understanding for the growing institutionalization in Asia, and in the
world in general. It can help shed light on both regional integration as well as globalization. This is
the starting point for my thesis. 
1 This argument is also sometimes referred to as 'functional' (Rosamond 2000:144).
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1.2 Purpose and Research Questions
The overarching aim of this paper is to examine the economic motives behind FTA creation within
the East Asian region, specifically whether FTAs have been created to manage existing economic
relationships, which is to say, to solve problems which have emerged due to strengthened economic
ties. In doing this, I will have both theory-testing and theory-building elements in my thesis.
This thesis poses the following two questions:
(1) To what extent have FTAs in East Asia been created to manage complicated economic
relationships?
This is the primary focus on of the paper, and I will attempt to analyze the question from two
directions. First, does the increase in FTAs match an increase in trade interdependence and
intraindustry trade, which I will propose as measures of this relationship? And second, are more
complicated economic relationships leading to more complicated FTAs? This is essential to
establish the link to economic management. 
(2) How do these economic measures vary between regional and non-regional relationships?
This question may seem quite tangential in relation to my first one, but I would argue that given
how situated FTAs are in the regionalism debate, it is necessary to say something about the regional
nature of what is going on. I am not able in this paper to analyze the regional nature of the FTAs
themselves, but I can analyze how these measures are regionally oriented. Thus, if they are linked to
FTA creation, it will say something indirectly about regionalism.
In analyzing these two questions, this paper will also serve some theory-building purposes.
This paper will not develop the actual arguments within the theory. There is much room to do that,
but that is not the paper's purpose. Instead, this paper will argue that the measures used in previous
research, especially research on the Asian sphere, are problematic. Alternative measures will be
proposed and argued for. Also, most research thus far into this question (both for Asian FTAs and
non-Asian ones) has focused on FTA creation, whereas to analyze the question in depth, it is
necessary, as Hamanaka points out (2012), to analyze the depth and coverage of FTAs to see if the
FTAs become more complex when the existing economic relationships are complex. In order to
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analyze that angle, I will propose and use a new method which I hope can help shed light on this
question. 
1.3 Previous Research
As noted earlier, studies on the effect of economic interdependence on FTA growth have in general
been quite limited, focusing instead on regional zero-sum measures of interdependence. These
measures assess to what degree countries within a particular region are biased toward trade with
each other, at the expense of other countries outside of the region. This does not, I would argue,
actually measure overall changes in economic interdependence.2 Hamanaka (2012) is an exception
to this, where he looks at individual trade shares within Asia and argues that more economically
interdependent relationships have produced more comprehensive FTAs. This is in line with my
thesis, however, it is applied solely to the Asian region.
While few studies have directly looked at quantitative changes in economic interdependence
and its connection with FTA creation, many studies have instead chosen to look at possible
mechanisms by which interdependence could affect FTA creation, thus studying the issue indirectly.
These studies have generally looked at business engagement both in the creation and shaping of
FTAs as well as actual usage rates of FTAs.
Ravenhill (2010) concludes that the functional argument is weak in the case of Asian FTAs,
arguing that it is not merely the lack of a quantitative change which excludes a likely
interdependence-based argument, but the lack of evidence of private-sector engagement as well as
low levels of FTA strength which makes the case stronger. Many studies have found a very large
degree of apathy toward FTAs in Asia on the part of business interests. This includes both apathy
toward the creation of FTAs, with low engagement either as campaigners for FTA construction, or
as consultants during the process. For an excellent overview of the extensive research into this, see
Postigo (2013).3 These findings have included almost the entirety of the Asian region, perhaps only
with the exception of Japan, where businesses have been found to be strongly engaged in the FTA
creation process, with some businesses actively campaigning for FTAs and others against (Solis
2010; Manger 2005).
In addition to the lack of private sector engagement in FTA construction, there have been
2 In the methodological chapter I will have a much more thorough discussion on these measures, their problems, and 
my alternative measures which I believe may better assess changes in interdependence.
3 This research is not completely unanimous. Postigo (2013) finds, for example, evidence of the business sector in 
Thailand and Malaysia playing an important role as government advisors during the FTA construction process, and 
that, moreover, the process by which the private sector is consulted has been streamlined and developed over time.
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low FTA utilization rates (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011; Ravenhill 2010; Baldwin 2008). These rates
have been quite low when seen in comparison to other regions, as well as quite low in absolute
numbers. There is some evidence, however, that, at least in the cases of Thailand and Vietnam rates
have increased substantially in recent years (Kawai and Wignaraja 2013). Strongly tied to the
argument that rates have been low is the argument that the FTAs themselves have been weak. The
benefits to using the FTAs have been low, in part due to already low tariff rates. Moreover, due to
the so-called "Noodle bowl" effect (Baldwin 2008), there is a lack of harmonization between
different agreements, specifically with regard to Rules of Origin (ROOs), which further reduces
their economic benefits.4 However, the general strength of the FTAs in Asia, as well as the extent of
their coverage has increased substantially throughout this period (Kawai and Wignaraja 2013). 
Put together, these arguments seem quite strong against neoliberal institutionalist argument.
The FTAs are seen as weak, and businesses are unconcerned either with using them or in their
creation.5 However, these arguments focus on proposed causal mechanisms. Even if businesses are
unengaged and uninterested, the governments may still be modeling their policies after economic
incentives, namely the desire to manage economic complexities. Thus, even with low business
engagement the economic interdependence argument can be salvaged, although the mechanism of
action (private-sector campaigning) may be challenged.  
While this issue is very important and understudied for Asia, it is similarly understudied at
the global level. Generally FTA creation is treated as exogenous, and so not explained by other
factors. The first systematic study of the economic determinants of FTA creation was done as late as
2004 by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), which found strong evidence for certain economic
characteristics being predictors of FTA creation. This study found that geographic proximity, size
and similarity of the economy, as well as differences in labor ratios, are predictors of FTA creation.
Since then, there have been few studies which have followed-up on this research, and thus the area
remains severely understudied (Baldwin and Jaimovich 2012). Baldwin and Jaimovich (ibid)
studied whether or not FTAs are "contagious," as Baldwin's domino theory predicts, and found that
they indeed were. However, these studies have focused only on FTA creation, and not whether the
complexity of the FTAs correspond to the complexity of the economic relationships, as would be
needed to properly assess the neoliberal institutionalist argument. Thus, this issue is ripe for
investigation.  
4 “Noodle bowl” Asia refers to the fact that there are many FTAs and that they overlap and have different rules, 
which presents a disordered image of economic institutionalization, as opposed to, for example, the ideal of a single
free trade area (Baldwin 2008).
5 The increased strength of the FTAs, as well as their increased use does seem to weaken that argument slightly.
Page 10
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
First I will provide a brief background to the topic. This will consist of two sections which cover
economic development in Asia as well as the history of regional integration efforts in the region.
The purpose of this section is not to be comprehensive, but rather to give the later arguments a
background in which to be situated.  Next, in the theory chapter, I will discuss the central theoretical
argument of this paper, namely that institutions are created to manage problems which emerge from
economic ties. I am referring to this as the neoliberal institutionalist argument. Also in the theory
chapter will be a section on the relationship between this argument and regionalism, as well as a
brief discussion on the acceptability of applying "Western" theories in an Eastern context. 
After the theory chapter I will discuss the quantitative methodology I employ. This chapter
will include a discussion on its potential uses and limitations. There will also be an extensive
discussion on the different indicators I chose to use, why I chose them, and how they can be
calculated. This section will also discuss the empirical strategy the paper undertakes and the data
sources to be used. Chapter 5 will present my empirical findings as well as discuss how they can be
interpreted and what conclusions will be drawn. The chapter begins with descriptive statistics, in
which the distribution of FTAs is looked at, as well as the trends in dependency and intraindustry
trade for the countries in question. This is followed by a section in which inferential statistics are
employed, in order to see if the comprehensiveness of FTAs can be predicted by interdependence or
intraindustry trade. Finally I will end with a conclusions chapter which will summarize the results
found, attempt to assess their contributions, and present ideas for further research. It is worth noting
that chapter 5 will continue many of the discussions present in the theory and methodology
chapters, as this paper is partly focused on theory-development. Moreover, many methodological
issues regarding how specific tests were done are discussed in that chapter as well, as it seems more
appropriate than front-loading everything into the methodological chapter.
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2 Historical Background
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background to the economic history of the East Asian
region, as well as a history of its regional development, and the characteristics of that development.
There is no intention here of being comprehensive. In fact, I hope the reader will forgive my
brevity. Comprehensiveness would be an overwhelming task which, for the purposes of this thesis,
would be largely unnecessary. In the regional-development section, the focus is only on a few select
organizations. Other organizations, both failed and successful, are ignored. This is not to say their
roles have been insignificant, or their existences irrelevant – the focus here is, however, just on the
most critical elements of Asian regional development, and the most critical ideas which emerge
from that development.
2.1 Economic History
The so-called “Asian Miracle” is the unprecedented growth seen among East Asian countries during
the 20th century which continues to extend into today (World Bank 1993). This growth began in
Japan, spread to the so-called “Asian Tiger” economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea
(hereafter, Korea) and Taiwan, and then continued further to China and the “Tiger Cub” economies
of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The sustained growth of these economies has
led to extensive poverty reduction in that part of the world (Quibria 2002). China alone, according
to their official statistics, has brought approximately 200 million people out of poverty, and there is
reason to believe that this is actually an underestimation (Yao 2000). 
The remarkable growth of these countries, over such a sustained period of time has led to an
immense amount of research into its possible causes. An “Asian Model” of growth has subsequently
been conceived.6 This model tends to stress several features, which Park (2002:338) specifies:
(1) These countries (economies) have all pursued export-oriented development strategies;
(2) They have been successful in maintaining high rates of saving and investment;
(3) Emphasis has been placed on promoting universal education and making enormous 
investments in human capital so as to better absorb and adapt the most advanced technology;
4) For almost all of the East Asian economies, with the exception of Hong Kong, industrial 
policies were an important part of their growth strategies.
6 In recent times there has also been research into a so-called "Beijing Consensus” (Ramo 2004) as a competitor to 
the “Washington Consensus”.
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Furthermore, in all of these countries, the government itself took a responsible role in promoting
growth (ibid). 
The problem with talk of an Asian model is that it can give the impression that there is
uniformity in the growth strategies of the Asian countries, where in fact what you see is similarity
instead, with a great deal of individual differentiation. For example, for many the “Asian Model” is
synonymous with a strong industrial policy. And that the reason these countries have all succeeded
so well is due to that industrial policy, which advocates argue can alter market incentives, to induce
investment into what would be risky ventures in critical or beneficial industries, more so than would
occur without the intervention of the government (Wade 2003). However, while this may seem
central to the growth of Asia as a whole, it neglects the fact that not all countries had strong
industrial policies (Quibria 2002). Thailand, for example, was almost completely absent an
industrial policy. While the government did attempt some meager interventions, they were largely
economically incoherent and poorly coordinated (ibid). 
It is clear that something happened (and is happening) in Asia which brought forth such
incredible growth rates. It is just unclear what exactly it is, due to the variety of models tried. What
is clear is that as countries grew, their success propelled other countries forward. This has been
named the “flying geese” hypothesis, and it predicts that as countries become more wealthy they
will invest in less wealthy countries and offshore much of their production (Lin 2011). Thus one
would expect to see tiered levels of development, which is in fact what one sees in Asia. This,
importantly for my paper, anticipated the beginning of regionalization in Asia.
Although it had begun to some degree earlier, it was the appreciation of the yen after the
Plaza Accord in 1985 which truly began the process of regionalization in East Asia. As Munakata
writes:
It first prompted Japanese firms to relocate their labor-intensive production process to 
lower-cost countries, causing a surge in export-oriented FDI to ASEAN countries. 
Manufacturers in newly industrializing economies, such as Korea and Taiwan, followed suit 
as their currencies also appreciated against the U.S. dollar (2006:134).
This process, it should be pointed out, is continuing today, with China now rapidly increasing its
outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). 
While the Plaza Accord may have been the first major turning point for Asian
regionalization, many argue, as was discussed briefly in the introduction, that a second turning point
occurred more recently – the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. Before this period, the IMF viewed
this region as economically stable, but suddenly after the crisis, the IMF demanded strong reforms,
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as they perceived the countries' institutions as rotten (Stiglitz 2002:90). Furthermore, IMF policies
imposed during the crisis may have worsened conditions for people living these countries – not to
mention that their policies before the crisis may have actually contributed to its onset (ibid:89). This
reaction from the international community led to a great deal of resentment within the Asian region
(Higgott 1998) and, as discussed briefly in the introduction, is argued to have increased the focus on
state-led regional measures in Asia (Dent 2013; Munakata 2006). 
2.2 Asian Regionalism
Before beginning a discussion on Asian regional development, it is critical to explain the difference
in the literature between regionalization and regionalism. As Hurrell (1995:334) puts it:
“Regionalization refers to the growth of societal integration within a region and to the often
undirected processes of social and economic interaction.” This can include increasing trade, more
complex trade, including an increase in intra-industry trade, increased migration, greater social
interaction, etc. (ibid). These processes, it is theorized, may lead to development of a regional
identity and/or formal institutional regional organizations and bindings. The increasing FDI
throughout Asia and the establishment of production networks in the wake of the Plaza Accord are
examples of this regionalization. Regionalism in contrast, refers to the institutional arrangements
constructed by governments in order to facilitate closer integration, whether that is economic
integration or political/security integration (Munakata 2006:130). 
The first major Asian regional organization which ought to be discussed is ASEAN (The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations), established on August 8, 1967. It was established with the
twin goals of “ensuring peace and stability […] in parallel to the promotion of economic growth and
social development” (Bulut 2012:55). The organization was founded by Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. However, its founding was encouraged and supported by the
United States as an attempt at hindering further expansion of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia
(Dent 2013). Since its founding, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam have also
become members, thus expanding its membership to ten countries. In 1992 ASEAN created one of
the region's first FTAs, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
Compared with other regional organizations, ASEAN can be considered under-
institutionalized. This however, is not necessarily considered a weakness by member governments.
Instead, member states “do not equate institutionalization with effectiveness” (Acharya 1998:59).
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ASEAN has developed its own system of operation, perhaps what can be called its own culture.
This has been called the “ASEAN Way”. It can be characterized as a system of personal ties
between country leaders, and an informal system of interaction and socialization (ibid). This system
eschews formal rule-based systems and instead embraces informal, ad hoc negotiations on issues, as
they arise. 
The other major Asian organization is APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). This
organization was founded by both Asian countries and Western countries (Including the U.S. and
Canada).7 The major purpose of APEC is the spread of economic liberalization (Baldwin 2008;
Bergsten 1997). It was purposefully designed against the spread of preferential trade liberalization
(such as FTAs, or Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), as they are sometimes called). Baldwin
argues that the creation of APEC was a means by which the United States prevented the creation of
strong regional preferential agreements, through the creation of a larger agreement (Baldwin
2008:458). In fact, although not explicitly defined, APEC has as a fundamental principle the idea of
“Open Regionalism” for the Asian sphere (Bergsten 1997). This can be roughly defined as a form of
non-exclusionary regional integration. That is, a form of regional integration, which does not create
barriers to the rest of the world. This is obviously a very hard concept to define, though Bergsten
envisions several possible configurations in which it could be achieved (ibid). And while he is in
favor of this system, and believes it actually makes sense, Baldwin, in contrast, argues that Open
Regionalism is an “oxymoron” and states: “APEC was explicitly designed to rule out preferential
trade liberalization, which is and always has been the defining element of regionalism” (2008:259). 
After the financial crisis of 1997, things in Asia began to change, and not just with regard to
the explosion of FTAs. The crisis arguably demonstrated the inability of either ASEAN or APEC to
deal sufficiently with the problems Asia faced (Stubbs 2002:448). The regional institutions were
simply not capable of acting in ways which were helpful. Moreover, the international community
through the IMF, as discussed previously, acted in a way which only worsened the conditions in
Asia (ibid). This, arguably, changed the thinking among Asian leaders, and strengthened the desire
for stronger, specifically Asian regional institutions. 
One of the first of such institutions to emerge was the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), which,
established in 1997, is a forum between the ASEAN countries, China, Korea and Japan. Since its
creation, it has been the main forum for financial cooperation in the Asian region (Hamilton-Hart
2006:123). Although similarly informal in nature, it has arguably achieved more than ASEAN.
Furthermore, it is the first major Asian regional organization with China, Japan, and Korea in
7 Its current membership consists of: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, China, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea,
Thailand, United States, and Vietnam.
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strong, leading positions. The APT has established many projects aimed at regional development, in
areas such as the promotion of small- and medium-sized businesses, food security, human resource
development, information technology, tourism, and many more (Stubbs 2002). Arguably the most
important development from the APT is the year 2000 establishment of the Chiang Mai Initiative
(CMI) – a multilateral currency-swap arrangement between the ten APT nations, with the goal of
being able to provide financial assistance in times of crisis (ibid).8 
It is within this growth of institutions that the growth of FTAs should be situated. As
indicated in the introduction, I believe it is problematic to view the growth to be merely a form of
regionalism – as well as studying it only from that perspective. However, that approach is quite
understandable, given the fact that the growth of the FTAs coincides with the growth of these other,
specifically regional-based organizations and institutions. In fact, FTA growth can perhaps be seen
as a further example of the open regionalism discussed above. However, some may disagree with
that assessment, as growth in bilateral preferential trading agreements may be considered too
exclusionary. In fact, it may be that in the globalized world of today, one cannot simply separate the
processes of globalization and regionalization, and that they are linked as responses to global
structural change (Väyrynen 2003). Thus it is conceivable that the twin developments of region-
specific FTAs and FTAs with the outside world are separate (and different) responses to
globalization, which, despite their intra- and inter-regional natures, can both be considered forms of
regionalism (Moon 2011). 
Even a short look at Asian regionalism shows that there are striking differences with
European regional integration, which forms the model on which many of theories of integration are
based (Acharya 2012). Characteristics of Asian regionalism, such as open regionalism and the
informal non-rule-based nature of the Asian institutions, differ greatly from the European example.
It is still unclear though if these will be permanent differences, due to culture and history. If they
are, the theories we have of regional integration may be unhelpful. However, they may become
helpful if the differences melt away, due to processes which apply for regions in general – and
perhaps that is what we are beginning to see now, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. 
8 The creation of the CMI came out of the failure of another institution – the Japanese-proposed Asian Monetary 
Fund (AMF), a true 'Asian' IMF. It was proposed in the midst of the 1997 financial crisis, and largely failed due to 
strong US opposition (Lipscy 2003). In contrast to the proposed AMF, the CMI is still tied to the IMF in certain 
respects.
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3 Theory
3.1 The Central Argument
The central argument of neoliberal institutionalism is that countries, out of self-interest, create
international institutions to manage international problems and deal with common concerns and
collective interests (Stein 2008). There have been many competing definitions of institutions, but
for the purposes of this paper, I will use the older, more restrictive, definition of an institution as: "a
formal arrangement transcending national boundaries that provides for the establishment of
institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic, social,
or related fields” (Plano and Otton 1979:288 as quoted in Stein 2008:203). Generally, institutions
can be created to achieve better international outcomes than would have been possible, had all states
been solely acting in their own self-interest (Stein 2008:208-209). 
These problems may be differentiated into separate categories.9 Coordination problems are
instances in which states' interests may generate many possible equilibria, and institutions are
needed in order to coordinate their interests and arrive at one equilibrium. These problems may
involve few conflicts of interests, or alternatively, strong conflicts of interest, which will thus
determine the difficulty in reaching an agreement (ibid). Collaboration problems occur when
countries following their own self-interests results in negative outcomes. These situations may be
considered prisoner dilemma problems. An example of such a situation would be the famous
“Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968), in which individuals (or in the international arena,
states) avoid protecting common goods, as it is not in their individual self-interest to do so.
Institutions allow states to reach preferred outcomes which would have been impossible if they had
all been operating individually (Stein 2008) Thus, institutions may emerge as ways to protect
against cheating. As stated by Keohane (1984:97): “In general, regimes10 make it more sensible to
cooperate by lowering the likelihood of being double-crossed. Whether we view this problem
through the lens of game theory or that of market failure, the central conclusion is the same:
international regimes can facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty.”
Interdependence can be defined as “mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics
refers to reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane and
9 While separating these problems into categories may be useful in the abstract, for the purposes of this paper, the 
categories will not be further dealt with.
10 Regimes, in this case, can be considered as a broader form of institutions. See Stein (2008:203).
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Nye 2012:7). To put more simply, interdependent countries are affected by what happens to each
other. Keohane and Nye continue: “These effects often result from international transactions – flows
of money, goods, people, and messages across international boundaries” (ibid). To increase the level
of interdependence would be to increase the effects which result from international transactions.
And increasing interdependence can increase the amount of conflicts, which will then require
greater institutional creation to achieve the cooperation needed to be managed (Keohane 1984:243).
Although I have throughout this paper, and especially in this paragraph, focused on
interdependence, it must be made clear that the institutional argument is not an argument about
responses to interdependence in itself, but rather complex international problems which may or may
not emerge as a result of interdependence. Hence, in addition to a basic measure of
interdependence, I am also using a measure of intraindustry trade as well in my analysis.
The argument here can easily apply in the case of FTAs. A simple problem is the problem of
tariffs. As countries increase trade with one another, the cost of tariffs becomes more substantial.
However, individual countries would be reluctant to unilaterally lower their own tariffs, for fear that
such acts would not necessarily be reciprocated. FTAs allow both countries to agree on mutual
decreases on tariffs, if both countries agree it is in their interests, and as a consequence they can
overcome a free-rider problem. However, as economic interdependence increases, or as the
economic relationship becomes more complex, the problems can become more substantial. These
may include, for example, environmental problems or labor standard problems. There may be a fear,
as countries become more economically intertwined within the international system, that one
country may lower their labor or environmental standards in order to attract investment, thus
compelling other countries to do the same in order to remain competitive. Institutions can therefore
step in to prevent such downward spirals, which would be negative for all parties. Similarly, if
countries wish to raise their labor or environmental standards, they may view the international
system as a stumbling block. If they do so unilaterally, they will become less competitive. So in
order to raise their own standards, countries can agree to come together to raise all of their
standards. Arguably, as countries become more integrated with one another, the number of issues
which could cause problems increases, and so the number and complexity of their institutions will
increase. 
Tied to the argument that institutions emerge to solve collective action problems is the idea
that states are primarily concerned with increasing their absolute gains. This is in contrast to the
realist contention that states are mostly focused on their relative gains (Powell 1993:209). The
difference between the two perspectives results in different predictions for the likelihood of
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institutional creation.11 A focus on relative gains makes cooperation less likely to occur, as, unless
both parties are perceived to gain equally, the less benefited state will be reluctant to agree to
cooperate, unless under some form of pressure. 
3.2 The Connection to Regionalism
As discussed in the introductory chapter, much of the previous research into my question has
stressed the regional nature of these FTAs, whether the author was arguing that they were
economically motivated or not. The possible economic motivation though, may be essential to
whether or not they can be drivers of regional integration, as Corning (2011:261) writes: “With
many questioning the economic value of FTAs in East Asia, there is considerable doubt that the
agreements can make any contribution to advancing regionalism.” However, why would the
institutional arguments presented above necessarily advance regionalism? Strictly speaking, there is
not theoretical agreement that, even if institutions are developed to manage collective action
problems, they would necessarily advance regional integration. At least not perpetually. Different
theoretical stances come to different conclusions on that issue, often based on how much power the
state retains, who the major actors are, and how automatic the process becomes. 
Neoliberal institutionalism argues that the state retains a great deal of power and that the
process of developing institutions depends on the preferences of the state (Rosamond 2000:142). As
a consequence, the automaticity of the process is quite limited. This is not the case with other
similar theoretical approaches, which also stress the “functional” nature of institutions.
Neofunctionalism, which is often synonymous with “integration theory” is much more favorable to
the idea that institutionalization can continue growing into true regional integration (ibid:50).
Neofunctionalism would argue that integration of some economic sectors would lead to “functional
pressures for the integration of related economic sectors,” resulting in the “gradual and progressive
entangling of national economies” (ibid:51). Increasing economic integration will require further
institutionalization and regulatory complexity, thus “political integration is a more or less inevitable
side-effect of economic integration” (ibid:52). Neofunctionalism's possibly most important concept
is the idea of 'spillovers' – which is that integration in “one economic sector would create pressures
for further economic integration within and beyond that sector” (ibid:59-60). To put it another way,
solving these collective action problems ends up creating further problems, thus putting the region
11 Of course, these are ideal types. It is unlikely that decisions are made completely ignoring either absolute gains or 
relative gains. Moreover, the language here uses “state” as if it was a unified individual actor, where that is plainly 
not the case.
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in question on a treadmill toward ever-further integration. This has, in the European case, been
argued to have not happened, and thus Haas, one of the founders of neofunctionalism, famously
declared integration theory obsolete (Haas 1975). Others have disputed this claim (Sweet and
Sandholtz 1997). 
As indicated above, the significance of the state is of critical importance to how automatic
the process of integration becomes. And with the diminishing role of the state with certain theories,
other actors take its place. Which actors they are depends on the theory in question. Grieco
explains: 
For functionalists, the key new actors in world politics appeared to be specialized 
international agencies and their technical experts; for neofunctionalists they were labor 
unions, political parties, trade associations, and supranational bureaucracies; and for the 
interdependence school, they were multinational corporations and transnational and 
transgovernmental coalitions (1993:119).
The role these actors play varies – from being a forum for change and for new intergovernmental
legislation to be passed, to being lobbyists for further integration. Thus the mechanism for
integration and institution-building was not uniform between schools of thought – and thus studies
which attack certain mechanisms, such as Ravenhill (2010) do not necessarily disprove the
overarching idea.  Furthermore, if states retain a great deal of power and act in their own interests,
and if their behavior “is strongly affected by the constraints and incentives provided by the
international environment” (Keohane 1984:26) this would justify system-level analysis of the
international system (ibid). This is not, of course, to deride research focused on finding and
studying causal mechanisms. Regardless of the extent of automaticity present in a particular theory,
or the exact mechanisms of action predicted, what these theories tend to have in common is that
they stress the role which economic integration plays on future political integration (Rosamond
2000:13). 
The more restrictive versions of this argument, such as the one proposed by neoliberal
institutionalists, argue that political integration however, may remain quite limited, as states may
not have extensive integration among their preferences. However, one may ask why integration
would be likely to happen most on the regional level? What sets regions apart from random
groupings of countries is that they usually have a much higher amount of exchange between each
other, which is to say that that their connections are more dense. Regions tend to have shared
history and culture, but also more integrated economic systems, higher levels of trade, and higher
levels of interactions of all kinds. Thus, regions are more ripe for integration than other areas. If
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they have higher levels of interactions with each other, they will potentially develop more collective
action problems, which may lead to greater institutionalization. Furthermore, in regions there are
often very high numbers of transactions with the same (common) partners, thus leading to the
possibility of multilateral institutions developing, as opposed to merely bilateral ones. 
3.3 Theoretical Concerns
A concern needs to be addressed before this thesis can proceed. That is, that it may be inappropriate
to attempt to apply integration theories, which were largely developed for the European case, to
non-European regions. Acharya asks (2012:13): 
[...] should we err on the side of induction, rather than deduction, that is, instead of having a 
set of general theoretical propositions and hypotheses (which tend to derive from the EU 
experience) to test in different regions, should we analyse each region on its own merit and 
then cumulatively generalise what is common and what is different?
This concern was also raised to Ravenhill, as he explains: “One referee for this journal suggested
that to apply such ‘western’ criteria in assessing East Asian regionalism was inappropriate. This
strikes me as the sort of argument that the late Susan Strange would have described as ‘woolly’”
(2010:24).
I would argue that this concern is largely misguided. It is not misguided if the fear is that
non-Western experiences are not factored in to the construction and testing of these “Western”
theories – that is to say, the non-Western experiences with regionalism should inform the theory. As
Acharya's statement indicates, there should still be an attempt to generalize theories from common
regional histories, the question becomes merely, should we first apply and test European-informed
theories or not. As we have built up a great deal of knowledge on what has happened in Europe,
how the processes have worked, it seems to me a waste not to apply that knowledge. Indeed it may
be the case that much of our expectations for other regions do not come true, but that should then
inform our theories, as the experience with the EU can be considered an n=1 study (Rosamond
2000:16-17). Indeed, current theories of integration may have faults which reduce their
generalizability, however, if we believe that there is a real world out there and in which theories can
be generalized and causal mechanisms identified, we must accept that much of which has been
theorized and discovered about Europe can apply in other spheres. This is expressed clearly by
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Sayer (2000:53):
To note that a particular kind of knowledge comes from a particular culture or is associated 
with a particular subject position, does not entail that it is valid for or applies only to those 
who belong to the same originating social group. Acupuncture is Chinese in origin but it can 
also work on non-Chinese people, just as western medicine can work on non-western 
people. Similarly, French social theory cannot be discounted as only applicable within 
France! To be sure, there is no view from nowhere – all knowledge is social, situated, and 
contextual. But it does not follow from this that truth claims can only be applicable to the 
particular groups who propose them. 
Thus, in this case, I would argue that applying to Asia this theory which was developed largely to
understand Europe, will help to better understand regional development in general, whether it is in
Asia or the West.
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4 Methodology
4.1 Methodological Choice
In writing this thesis I have decided to use a quantitative methodology. This choice is related to both
my limitations as a researcher as well as the unique benefits of this approach. I am not physically
located in Asia, nor do I at the moment speak any Asian language. Thus my ability to either conduct
interviews or examine written records is quite limited. Moreover, the fact that this phenomenon was
not limited to any one country or any particular small set of countries would limit the ability of any
one researcher to conduct such studies on the entire phenomenon. 
A quantitative methodology has several large benefits. For the first, there is a wealth of good
data available, which covers many years and many countries. Quantitative analysis, whether it be
merely descriptive statistics or inferential statistics, allows researchers to look at many disparate
events and develop what is almost a visual understanding of them. It allows researchers to notice
and locate patterns which previously would lie hidden. For the specific research goals in this thesis,
a quantitative methodology is particularly applicable. I am examining a phenomenon which is very
large in scope, occurring over decades, which includes dozens of countries. It also focuses on trade
patterns, which would be difficult to examine outside of this methodology. 
It is worth noting that quantitative research relies on probabilistic logic, correlational logic.
That is to say, one examines whether different variables tend to move together. Although one may
speak of dependent and independent variables, in a way there is no difference in itself between
them. The difference comes from theory. “Quantitative data analysis is as much a logical enterprise
as it is a statistical one” (Anashensel 2002:1). Choice of statistical technique, as well as
understanding of results should be informed by theory, and not the other way around (ibid:8). What
one wishes to find is that two things tend to go together. That is to say, one argues that the presence
of a particular independent variable makes it more likely that a particular dependent variable will be
present. While it may be very hard to find particular connections between variables when looking at
a small set of cases, especially if direct access to the mechanisms in question is difficult to obtain,
when examining very large sets of cases, relationships can more easily be noticed. If it is argued
based on qualitative research that x causes y, and a large set of cases show that x and y are not
correlated, this puts the argument in serious question.
However, it needs to be emphasized further that using a quantitative methodology does not
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allow one to escape theory. One cannot simply 'examine the data'. What is included as a variable has
to be informed by theory and logic, and what ends up being included has a very large effect on the
statistical findings. Excluding a variable because it is not perceived to be a cause, when it actually
is, may result in incorrect, or at least incomplete, findings. Furthermore, determining what is
actually cause and effect is an added difficulty with quantitative research, as showing a correlation
does not show causal direction. Theory and logic need to be applied in order to uncover
relationships and causal direction. Moreover stating that something is statistically significant only
means that it is unlikely to be from chance. Thus, especially when examining many variables and
many models, spurious relationships will be detected. Furthermore, that a relationship is statistically
significant does not say anything about real-world significance, that is to say, a large, meaningful
relationship. 
The problem which I am examining, the connection between economic interdependence and
the creation of FTAs in Asia, warrants, I would argue, multiple methodological approaches. My
research may show that there is a statistical, that is to say, probabilistic connection between the two,
but it will not be able to show exactly what happened in particular cases, or who the major actors
were. Despite these limitations, this research should help inform other research projects, which may
have different methodologies.
4.2 Operationalization
In order to test the effects of complex trading relationships we are first faced with the problem of
operationalization. A concept itself cannot be observed, instead, as Anashensel (2002:33) explains:  
[it] is inferred from its presumed manifestations, referred to as observed variables o r 
measured variables. The measured variable is, in effect, a surrogate or proxy for the 
construct. Scores on the measured variable are seen as being produced by the underlying 
construct, the assumption that links the theoretical realm to the empirical world. This 
process of operationalization entails deductive reasoning […]
As previously mentioned, I am choosing to use two separate measures: a measure of
interdependence and intraindustry trade.12 Interdependence, as previously explained, is when states
are mutually dependent on each other, when they are particularly sensitive to changes in
12 I will argue that intraindustry trade can actually be considered as a form of interdependence, but for clarity, I will 
refer to it separately throughout the rest of the paper, and my other measure will be simply called a measure of 
interdependence.
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transactions between each other. This however, does not, necessarily imply a complex trading
relationship which requires management, to solve collective action problems, and similar problems.
I would argue that it likely that as countries become more dependent on each other, or a region, that
such a situation would arise, however, this is not necessarily the case. Therefore, I am also using
intraindustry trade as a measure. Intraindustry trade can be defined as the simultaneous import and
export of similar types of goods or services.
There could have been other options here. For example, I could have looked at sectoral
preferences, arguing that more advanced goods require more management. However, I have instead
chosen intraindustry trade for a variety of reasons. First, intraindustry trade is an interesting
phenomenon. It is not thoroughly understood, and there are several interesting empirical findings
attached to it. For example, it has risen considerably since the 1980s among OECD countries, and it
is higher among more complicated products (electronics, machinery, etc.) (Marrewijk 2008).
Second, it could be seen as a deepening of interdependency, or at least a different form of it. On the
face of it, intraindustry trade actually seems like the opposite of interdependence. After all, if
countries trade very different products, they are dependent on each other for those things which they
do not produce, however, if they trade the same sorts of products, are they really so dependent on
each other? This argument though does not necessarily hold up. We can see this from Krugman's
explanation for one argument about why intraindustry trade emerges:
The conventional forces of comparative advantage operate on groups of products 
("industries") and thus give rise to interindustry specialization and trade. Economies of scale
in production, however, lead each country to produce only a subset of the products within 
each group, so that there is also intraindustry specialization and trade. This provides a 
simple explanation of two of our empirical ostensible paradoxes. Countries with similar 
factor endowments will still trade because of scale economies, and their trade will be largely
intraindustry in character (1981:960).
Thus, an increase in intraindustry trade indicates that countries are specializing less on product
groups, and more on ever smaller subsets of those groups. Thus the network of trade is becoming
denser. This can explain why advanced economies have increased their intraindustry trade since the
1980s and it is higher in more complicated products. As technological capacities have increased, the
amount of complicated products being traded has increased, and those products consist of many
smaller components, thus allowing ever deeper specialization. Thus, for a practical example, a
modern computer consists of hundreds, if not thousands of products, which may be produced
among dozens of countries. This, I would argue, should constitute a form of interdependence and it
indicates why increased management may be necessary, due to the complicated nature of
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production, as not only consumption relies on foreign products, but a great deal of production as
well. Furthermore, and related to the preceding argument, this brings up the final reason why I have
chosen intraindustry trade as my other explanatory variable: a large proportion of intraindustry trade
is made up of intra-firm trade, that is, trade which occurs within one firm which is spread among
several states (Marrewijk 2008). This clearly could be an instance in which economic problems may
emerge which require institutions for management. 
Despite what I have written above about using interdependence and intraindustry trade as
measures, they themselves are not actually measures. They are also concepts, and as concepts they
need to be operationalized. Then they can be studied and, in this case, with a quantitative
methodology, calculated and manipulated as numbers. 
4.2.1 Interdependence
Surprisingly, “Even scholars who study the political effects of interdependence have difficulty in
defining and conceptualizing this most central of concepts in the discipline” (Blanchard and
Ripsman 2001:96). In fact, even classics in the field such as Power and Interdependence by
Keohane and Nye (1977) or After Hegemony by Keohane (1984) do not provide clear instructions
for how interdependence ought to be calculated.
Despite this lack of clarity, when it is used in research, the vast majority of scholars decide
to focus on the importance of trade to a state's economy (Blanchard and Ripsman 2001:98). This,
argues Blanchard and Ripsman, is a mistake. They argue that other economic ties between
countries, such as foreign investment and the globalization of capital markets, deserve serious
attention (ibid:99). Despite their condemnation, I will continue the tradition and focus on trade data.
There are two primary reasons for this: the first is the great availability of the data. This is
something which must be taken into consideration. The second is that if I am partly responding to
existing research in the field, I should not begin with too large of a deviation. Ravenhill (2010)
focused on trade interdependence and asserted that it did not increase during the period in question.
However, I would argue that his choice of measures is faulty, and thus I will attempt to show that, in
fact, trade interdependence did increase (whether or not that actually caused the explosion in FTAs).
Outside of the research into institution-formation, there has been a large focus on the effect
that trade interdependence has on peace and conflict, and within that literature there are two primary
measures which are used, which leads to conflicting results (Gartzke and Li 2003). This only goes
to illustrate the importance of the measure used, and that inappropriate operationalization will lead
to unreliable results. The first possibility is using a measure of trade interdependence based on a
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country's trade share (Barberi 1996). A trade share between two countries, i and j can be calculated
for country i as:
dyadic tradeij
total tradei
From that value, trade interdependence can be calculated (ibid:36). This forms the same basis as the
measures used in the field to measure economic interdependence in Asia. Ravenhill (2010) uses
intra-regional trade shares as his measure of interdependence, which looks at the fraction of total
trade regional trade takes up. He finds that between 1995 and 2006, intra-regional trade shares rose
from 37.6% to only 38.3% (ibid:5). While he is using this indicator as a measure of
interdependence, he is primarily using it as a measure of regional integration. However, even for
that purpose there are acknowledged problems with its usage (Anderson and Norheim 1993). It
makes comparisons between regions impossible, as the size and number of the countries influence
the value considerably, and the introduction of any countries to the region, even if those countries
are not biased toward regional trade, will increase the value (ibid). As a remedy, he shows values
from an intra-regional trade intensity measure (Ravenhill 2010).
However, both of those measures are inappropriate for measuring whether actual
interdependence has increased. Instead, a non-zero sum measure should be used. That is to say, the
issue in question is not whether or not countries within the Asian region are biased toward trade
with each other. The issue is the degree in which they are dependent on trade, regardless of where it
originates. FTAs are not solely signed between countries within the region, so if we are to
understand whether they are partially constructed to deal with problems of growing
interdependence, we need a measure which is not region-specific. If regional trade-shares had
increased, that would not explain why FTAs were signed in such great number with non-regional
partners. This argument was used in the introductory chapter, but it needs to be reiterated. To
attempt to make this argument more clear, imagine if we were to ask if the world itself has become
more economically interdependent. Treating the world as a region, we would never see any change
using these measures. And yet we speak of the world becoming more interdependent. The measure
chosen needs to be able to deal with regional, and non-regional trade, and allow both of them to
increase under the same period. 
The second measure of trade interdependence which Gartzke and Li (2003) discuss, allows
us to do that. In order to calculate this value for country i, we first need to calculate its dependence.
To do that we use the formula:
total trade ij
GDPi
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Thus a country's dependence on a trading relationship is the total amount of trade between those
two countries divided by that country's GDP. This can easily be extended to a region, or the whole
world. The total trade between the entities in question, divided by the GDP. So, as an example, if I
wanted to calculate China's dependency on ASEAN, I would sum up all trade between China and
ASEAN countries, and divide that total by China's GDP. As a result, dependence can increase
within a country-pair, a region, and the world simultaneously, if trade with all those partners
increases as a percentage of GDP. This, however, is trade dependence, to get trade interdependence,
we are faced with a difficulty in how to calculate it. Within the literature, there are two main ways
in which this is calculated (Min Gyu Koo 2010:50): the first option is the so-called 'weak link'
method, which is to take the lowest level of dependence between a pair of countries as the level of
interdependence. The logic is that the country which has the least at stake is essentially the one
which determines how interdependent the pair is (ibid). The other option is to take a mean of the
two values. And the geometric mean is what is used. So for countries i a n d j the level of
interdependence between them would be:
√trade dependence i∗trade dependence j
Both of these calculations would need to be modified to work on a regional or global scale, but for
the purposes of this paper, those do not need to be calculated. The interdependency ratios in this
paper will be calculated just between pairs of countries. As far as which to use in this paper, I will
use and test both the 'weak link' and the geometric mean versions.
4.2.2 Intraindustry Trade
Fortunately, calculating intraindustry trade is more straightforward than creating a measure of
interdependence. There are disagreements about how to calculate it, however, as it is simply a
measure of how similar imports and exports are, there is not the same question of what exactly the
concept is. Operationalization is far more straightforward.13 For this paper I will be using the most
commonly used measure of intraindustry trade, the Grubel-Lloyd index, proposed by Grubel and
Lloyd (1975). It is straightforward and makes intuitive sense. 
To calculate the intraindustry trade level for a particular sector, one uses the following equation:
13 Intraindustry trade can be broken up into horizontal and vertical intraindustry trade - where horizontal intraindustry 
trade "refers to the simultaneous exports and imports of goods classified in the same sector and at the same stage of
processing" and vertical intraindustry trade "refers to the simultaneous exports and imports of goods classified in 
the same sector and at different stages of processing" (Marrewijk 2008:2). This paper, however, does not make the 
differentiation.
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GLsector i=1−(
|export sector i−importsector i|
exportsector i+import sector i
)
Thus, the level of intraindustry trade present in a particular economic sector is determined by
dividing the absolute difference between exports and imports in that sector by the total amount of
trade within that sector, and then subtracting that from one. As a result, the index ranges from zero,
which represents complete interindustry trade, and one, which represents complete intraindustry
trade.
The above equation provides a value for a particular sector. In order to calculate the level of
intraindustry trade in total, the values for all sectors need to be averaged together. To be accurate, I
calculated a weighted average in every instance. Moreover, when calculating intraindustry trade,
one is faced with the issue of how narrow a sector one defines. This is done when picking the 'digit
level' to be used. Goods are categorized into different groups, with higher digit levels holding ever
more specific goods. As an example, for Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) revision
2, which is the classification system I used, code 7 includes all "Machinery and transport
equipment", and code 71 includes "Power generating machinery and equipment, and code 711
includes "Steam boilers and auxiliary plant; and parts thereof". This particular classification system
goes up to the 5th digit level, with each additional digit providing ever greater specificity. I chose to
use data at the 2-digit level, primarily for two reasons. The first is that it is likely to be more
accurate, as countries may categorize certain products differently, especially at higher levels. The
second and more important reason, is to include goods which are traded at different stages of
production, as the organic spread of production networks in Asia have been an essential component
of regionalization (Munakata 2006). However, this research can easily be extended by comparing its
results with results at greater digit-levels.
4.3 Empirical Plan
There are two major components to my thesis. The first includes descriptive statistics, and the
second, inferential statistics. They are both important to making my argument.
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
As previously discussed, there is a major problem with looking at the region as a whole, attempting
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to tie overall changes in interdependence (and in this case intraindustry trade) to changes in FTA
construction. Individual countries have very different connections both to the region (that is, to each
other) as to the world. While it could be the case that, as Ravenhill (2010) argues, interdependence
has stagnated, it does not automatically follow from that that every country has faced the same
stagnation. Hence, in my study I will calculate both dependency and intraindustry trade levels for
each individual country, both with the region and the world. In the case of dependency ratios, I
calculate the amount of dependency on the ASEAN countries, the three Northeast Asian countries,
and the world, whereas for the intra-industry trade values, I calculate for just the entire region
(APT) and the world. 
By looking at individual countries and the changes they go through during the period of
1995-2010, I am able to do several things. First, I can see to what extent each country changes
during this period. While we may analyze the overall trend for the region, it is important to note the
distribution of those changes. Have the changes been uniform, or dominated by particular states?
And second, how do the different countries differ in their overall values? Do the countries which
have higher levels of intraindustry trade and dependence have higher FTA counts? While the rise of
FTAs was a region-wide phenomenon, some countries signed drastically more FTAs than others. 
4.3.2 Inferential Statistics
The major problem with the above is that it does not necessarily show the purpose of the FTAs -
whether or not they have been constructed to manage complex economic relationships, as the
neoliberal institutionalist argument states (Stein 2008; Hurrell 1995). Hamanaka (2012:14) explains
the problem and provides a potential solution: 
While one tends to assess whether or not the proliferation of FTAs in Asia can be explained 
by the overall development of trade interdependence in the region, such a general analysis 
does not reveal much about the relationship between de facto and de jure trade integration. 
Rather, we need to examine the level of economic interdependence of a particular set of 
Asian countries and consider whether this affects the modality of economic agreements 
among them.
Hamanaka continues that there are two possible hypotheses about the signing of these agreements.
They could be signed to "formalize or institutionalize the management of increasingly complex and
dense economic interdependencies within a region [...]" (ibid) or that the opposite chain of causality
is actually possible: that FTAs are used to induce trade, and not manage existing trade (ibid:15).14 
14 It is worth pointing out that Hamanaka (2012) focuses on FTAs within the region, and thus focuses on regional 
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While I agree with his analysis, and I think he has a good proposal to examine the levels of
interdependence and types of agreements between just a small set of countries, I have decided to
attempt to apply this argument to a large quantitative set. Specifically, I have conducted regression
analyses on all bilateral15 East Asian FTAs (including FTAs between Asian and non-Asian
countries) for which data is available from 2000 to 2013. My dependent variable is a measure of
how complex the FTA is, and the independent variables are the two different measures of
interdependence and the measure of intraindustry trade. These values were calculated for each pair
of countries for the year the FTA was signed.  
In order to measure the dependent variable, I have been inspired by work done by Kawai
and Wignaraja (2009), wherein they categorized FTAs by how many WTO-plus provisions they
have.16 Specifically, in Appendix 6, they analyze a number of FTAs and establish which provisions
(WTO-plus and not) are covered by various FTAs. I have selected six of these provisions:
Intellectual Property, Environment, Labor Standards/Movement of Natural Persons,
Education/Human Resource Development, Investment, and Government Procurement. I selected
these because they extended beyond standard goods and services coverage, and because they cover
a range of issues. In order to assess whether a particular FTA covered a particular provision or not, I
developed strict rules, as it was not always straightforward whether or not a provision was actually,
meaningfully covered. These rules will allow my research to be replicated in the future.17 
I classify an FTA as having a particular provision if any one of the four conditions is met:
1) There is a detailed description of the area in question, that is to say, the FTA specifically 
regulates behavior or cooperation in a particular issue area.
2) They state that they will cooperate on the issue. However, this is counted only if the issue 
is dealt with separately. It is not counted if it is part of a long list of areas for cooperation.
3) The issue is specifically discussed as a matter in arbitration, should there be a conflict.
4) The FTA points to another agreement signed between the states in question (i.e. not a 
WTO agreement) which specifically deals with the issue.
These rules could have been either more lenient or more strict, and subsequently would produce
different results. I discuss later that, if anything, these rules ought to be more strict, perhaps even
checking if cooperation took place or regulation was followed. This would increase the accuracy of
measures. While I have discussed the problems with this, his analysis here can apply to both regional and outside 
FTA construction.
15 I did not include multilateral FTAs because this may present methodological and theoretical problems. 
Methodologically, how to measure interdependence becomes an issue and theoretically, if it is justified to compare 
multilateral and bilateral FTAs together, when their emergence may rely on different political conditions.
16 WTO-plus provisions are provisions which exceed the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework.
17 As I developed my rules I checked my results against the results from Kawai and Wignaraja (2009) and could not 
ever find a rule set which produced the same results as theirs. And they did not specify how they made their 
determinations. Hence, my results do not completely match theirs.
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any analysis. 
The number of provisions each FTA held was counted and became the dependent variable in
each observation. Then five models were tested, one for each independent variable alone, and two
with one measure of interdependence paired with the measure of intraindustry trade. If the
neoliberal institutionalist hypothesis is correct - and assuming my operationalization is proper - we
should see that higher levels of interdependence and intraindustry trade between pairs of countries
in the years the FTAs are signed lead to more complex FTAs (FTAs with higher counts on the
dependent variable). As I am using count data as the dependent variable, standard Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression is unsuitable, and instead a poisson model has been used (Kennedy
2008:246).
This approach should be contrasted with how other studies of FTA formation have handled
the issue (Baldwin and Jaimovich 2012; Baier and Bergstrand 2004). In those cases, economic (and
political) measures were used as predictors for FTA formation. However, even if certain economic
variables predict FTA formation, this does not create a strong argument that the FTA was created to
manage economic problems which emerged from the economic activity. They could have been
created to increase trade further, or to bring the governments closer together, or because closer
economic relationships establish closer identity-based ties, or other possibilities as well. My
approach does not completely rule out other explanations, but it does provide for a stronger
argument. It also needs to be mentioned that focusing solely on FTA creation presents certain
methodological problems, namely what year to use. As the dataset would have to include country-
pairs with and without FTAs, a year for the economic data needs to be picked. If, for example, a
date is picked before an FTA had been signed, there is the possibility that between that year and the
year the FTA was signed economic activity increased substantially. And if a year is picked after an
FTA was signed, there is the problem that the FTA itself may have increased economic activity
substantially, introducing endogeneity. 
4.4 Data Sources and Scope
The scope of this paper will be the period of 1995 to 2013. This both due to issues of data
availability and because this is the main period in question. The countries which I look at will
include the five original ASEAN countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand, as well as the three northeast Asian countries of China, Japan, and Korea. With China, I
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am including just data from mainland China, and am not using data from Hong Kong, Taiwan, or
Macau. The other ASEAN countries were not included for two primary reasons: the data was not as
consistently available, and by and large they were excluded from the FTA growth.18 
To reiterate, while I have stated that this is a study which looks at economic
interdependence, it is more accurately a study which looks at trade interdependence, as I am
restricting my data to trade data (as was made clear previously). Thus, other forms of possible
economic interactions, such as FDI, are not included. 
Data on trade will come from the UN COMTRADE (2014) database. This is a database of
bilateral trade data. It allows not just total trade levels to be analyzed, but also extremely nuanced
breakdowns of specific items traded, which is needed to calculate intraindustry trade. General data
on FTAs come from the Asian Development Bank's FTA database – compiled by the Asia Regional
Integration Center (ARIC 2014). This is a database which compiles an up-to-date list of all the
various FTAs in Asia, both signed and in development. It holds details on those FTAs including
critical dates, and when available, organized texts of the actual agreements. My analysis of the texts
of FTAs was done using that database, as well as the documents themselves, found on other
websites – usually (but not exclusively) government websites. Within the works cited section of this
thesis are the references for where all FTA texts can be retrieved. Data on GDP comes from the
World Bank (2014). Lastly, both the GDP data and the COMTRADE data are in current US dollars,
thus ensuring compatibility. 
4.5 Limitations
While I hope that this study can prove to be a worthy contribution to the field, there are many
limitations to its methodology that ought to be acknowledged and discussed.
Perhaps the first limitation which ought to be discussed is the fact that I have not been able to
completely rule out alternative explanations. I have attempted to analyze the complexity of the
FTAs to see if their complexity is correlated with the complexity of the economic relationships they
are based on. This is an attempt to see if the FTAs are used to deal with economic problems, as a
neoliberal institutionalist would assert. It is possible however that an alternative explanation is
correct, for example, that close economic relationships have caused a change in identities and a
18 As members of ASEAN they are part of AFTA and ASEAN itself has signed agreements with other countries, but it 
is debatable what role they played.
Page 33
desire to have closer political relationships as well. However, I do not believe that is likely, as
approximately half of the FTAs studied are with non-Asian actors, where such a change would not
be predicted. 
This study is limited in its theory-testing ability, due in part to its theory-building side. I
have provided arguments for the problems present in existing studies used for testing the theory – as
well as the lack of methodological consideration given to how to test the theory, and as a result I
have proposed certain measures which may be used, as well as a new methodological approach to
testing the functional argument. These proposals, however, may be problematic themselves. While I
have put a great deal of thought into the ways of operationalizing interdependence, it may be that
there are other measures which are better. Moreover, it needs to be very clear that I am focusing
solely on trade interdependence, while economic interdependence encompasses much more.19 It is
quite possible that the empirical results would be different if these other economic angles were
measured instead, or if intraindustry trade was measured at a different digit level.  
Moreover, the decision with regards to how strict to be in qualifying an FTA provision is
another limitation. Stricter rules for WTO-plus provisions could lead to different, and possibly more
accurate, results. Therefore, for a much more thorough analysis, more provisions should be
analyzed and the rules should be more strict, perhaps classifying a feature as present only if there
are clear instructions for the management of that feature, or outside evidence that through the FTA
cooperation actually took place. These measurement issues further illustrate that negative empirical
results do not necessarily disprove the theory, as the problem may lie with the testing (Chalmers
1999:87).
Lastly, my study is correlational in nature and looks at the area at the system-level – thus it
is limited by what it is not. No interviews were conducted, no speeches were analyzed, nor was
process-tracing conducted on any FTAs. Thus, in order to measure causal mechanisms, other studies
would be needed. It also does not hurt to reiterate the familiar statement that “correlation does not
imply causation” (Aneshensel 2002:64). Relationships found through data-analysis do not
necessarily indicate a direct causal relationship from the independent variables to the dependent
variables. It is quite possible that third variables are affecting both sides of the equation. Further
quantitative and qualitative analysis can help determine how the relationships actually work. 
19 A strong argument can be made that, as my inferential section tests more comprehensive institutionalization, which 
covers more issues than simply trade, such as training, environmental regulation, investment, etc., that it is 
inappropriate to only use measures of trade. However, I am hoping that these measures can act as proxies for other 
forms of economic integration.
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5 Empirical Results and Analysis
5.1 FTA Distribution
It is very important, before examining the levels of interdependence for these countries, to look at
the distribution of FTAs, both how many are signed involving each country, as well as whether they
are located within the APT region or outside of it. Thus when measures of interdependence and
intraindustry trade are examined, it can be seen whether or not they correspond to the actual
distribution of FTAs, and thus not a simple correlation of more interdependence and more FTAs.
Here in the table below I show the separation between FTAs signed within the region and
outside of it for the eight countries I am examining.
[Table 1: FTAs within the region and outside it.]
Asia Plus Three Rest of World
China 6 8
Indonesia 5 4
Japan 8 5
Korea 2 9
Malaysia 5 8
Philippines 5 2
Singapore 7 14
Thailand 7 5
Source: ARIC (2014). Note: APT includes agreements signed with Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan - all signed with
China. 
Looking at this chart, the degree of variation becomes obvious. Singapore, for example, has signed
fourteen FTAs with the non-APT world, while the Philippines has signed only two. Both the volume
and the regional degree varies with each country. In fact, no two countries have the same
distribution. Moreover, two further things can be seen, which ought to be noted. First, there are
indeed a great number of non APT agreements signed, as discussed earlier. Second, the agreements
within the region seem quite numerous and do seem like the “Noodle bowl” discussed previously.
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Both of these points deserve further reflection. 
Regarding the non-regional FTAs, it must be noted that a great number of these are within
what I will call “greater Asia”. The Asian Development Bank has designated 48 countries to be a
part of the Asia-Pacific region. Slightly more than half of “Rest of World” agreements listed above
are actually involving only (or mostly) countries in this Asia-Pacific region. Analyzing the different
levels of interdependence with the “greater Asia” countries and the non-greater Asia countries
would be quite important. This paper, however, has restricted itself to looking at only the difference
between APT countries and the whole rest of the world. So, I have presented only the binary
differentiation. 
Secondly, it is worth looking more closely at this noodle bowl phenomenon. I believe this is
deceptive. While there are a great number of agreements signed among the APT countries, there is
also a great deal of double-counting due to AFTA, which includes all the ASEAN countries. Thus, it
is listed above for all the ASEAN countries. Moreover, ASEAN has signed agreements with India,
Japan, Korea, China and a combined agreement with Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, for all
the ASEAN countries, all of those agreements are listed above, indicating an inflated amount of
agreements signed. 
Therefore, I would argue, it is important to look at the ASEAN countries specifically, and
see how many agreements they have signed on their own, not as a part of ASEAN – as the ASEAN
agreements may reflect not necessarily their own interdependence and economic motives, but the
group's or the interests of powerful members. 
[Table 2: Bilateral agreements signed by ASEAN countries.]
Asia Plus Three Rest of World
Indonesia 1 2
Malaysia 1 6
Philippines 1 0
Singapore 3 12
Thailand 3 3
Source: ARIC (2014)
The chart above shows the agreements signed by the individual ASEAN countries, not their
ASEAN agreements, and not AFTA. The noodle bowl may still be present, arguably, but the
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complexity of intra-Asian agreements has definitely decreased. However, what is very interesting
here is that the differences present between different countries become even more stark. Only
Singapore and Thailand have signed more than one additional agreement within the APT region.
And Singapore and Malaysia have signed many more agreements with the rest of the world than the
other countries. 
Looking at the two charts above, one can make some tentative predictions. China, Korea,
Malaysia and Singapore have signed the most number of agreements with the rest of the world, so
one would expect their levels of interdependence and intraindustry with the rest of the world to be
the highest. Japan would be somewhat lower, and Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand would be
lowest, with the Philippines being at the absolute bottom. Predictions about intra-Asian levels
becomes more difficult, as it is less obvious how to approach the problem. While almost all the
agreements with the rest of the world are bilateral in nature, and as there are so many countries in
the rest of the world one can sign agreements with, it becomes clear that the number agreements is a
worthy measure to look at. However, it is not the same when looking at the APT region. In that case
there are only thirteen countries. Of those thirteen, ten are part of a free trade area. The other three
countries have, moreover, all signed agreements with that area. While some countries have signed
bilateral agreements with each other, it is unclear how that should be reflected in general changes in
interdependence. After all, some countries may choose, despite high levels of interdependence, to
put their efforts into extending and strengthening AFTA and its agreements. Hypothetically, if there
was one very strong free trade area among all thirteen countries, all of those countries would only
have one FTA within the region. That would not lead one to predict that the levels of
interdependence ought to be lower than with non-regional actors. 
While, the distribution of FTAs may indicate which countries should have higher levels of
interdependence and intraindustry trade, we can argue that for all the countries generally, we should
be seeing an increase in the measures both within the region and outside of it, which would
correspond to the growth of these agreements. This is a growth in interdependence which other
measures, such as regional trade shares, have ignored.
5.2 Interdependence
In this section I present data about relative dependence levels, calculated by dividing trade volumes
by GDP levels. For the eight countries in question I calculated these ratios for the years 1995, 2000,
2005 and 2010, for both dependence on the ASEAN region, the APT region, and the rest of the
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world as a whole. 
The graph below shows the ratios in a stacked chart for ASEAN and the “plus three”
countries. 
[Graph 1: Regional dependency ratios.]
Source: COMTRADE (2014); World Bank (2014). Note: The ASEAN values include dependency on the other ASEAN
countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.
Here we can see several interesting things. First, the ASEAN countries are much more dependent on
the region than the non-ASEAN countries. This includes dependency on both the ASEAN region
and the “plus three” countries. There also seems to be a general trend toward increasing
dependence, though the trend is more obvious with some countries than others. Also with many
countries, the 2010 values are lower than the 2005 values, probably as a result of the 2008
economic crisis. It can also be seen that for most of the countries, the dependency on plus three
countries is higher than the dependency on the ASEAN countries. Thus, one can state that while the
ASEAN countries are in general very dependent on China, Japan and Korea, the dependence is not
reciprocated. Chinese and Japanese dependence especially, both on the ASEAN region and the
Northeast Asian economies is very low, although it has increased substantially percentage-wise -
though this is quite difficult to see in the chart above, but will be returned to later in this section.20 
The higher levels of dependency from ASEAN countries, even from the first measurements
20 Some readers may find it strange to see trade values exceeding GDP values, however this is due to the differences 
in how the two are calculated (Anderson 2007).
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in 1995, can perhaps explain the creation of AFTA so much earlier than the other Asian FTAs.
While those countries were very dependent on the region, the Northeast Asian countries were not.
Thus the incentive to form these agreements was much lower for the Northeast Asian countries than
with the Southeast Asian countries.
[Graph 2: Global dependency ratios.]
Source: COMTRADE (2014); World Bank (2014).
The graph above shows much the same thing as the previous one, except with values for the rest of
the world. Note that it does not differentiate between “greater Asia” and non-Asian countries. Here
again there seems to be a general trend toward more dependency, though the degree of change again
varies by country. The trend is also more evident with some countries than others. And once again
the values for 2010 are in almost all cases lower than the values for 2005. It is important to note
here, that if one compares the dependency ratios with those from the previous graph, one notes that
while the values for the rest of the world are fairly similar to the values for the combined APT
region for ASEAN countries, the world values are considerably higher for China, Japan and Korea.
Thus, while the ASEAN countries are approximately as dependent on the APT region as they are to
the rest of the world, the plus three countries are more dependent on rest of the world. 
Again Malaysia and Singapore have substantially higher dependency ratios than the other
countries, which corresponds to the higher level of FTAs signed by those two countries. The other
individualized predictions are less confirmatory. While China, Japan and Korea are predicted to
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have higher levels than Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, this is not the case. The Philippines
(aside from in year 2010) and Thailand have, generally higher levels than all three, while Japan has
the lowest ratios of all. 
It is important to note here, that while we are analyzing these dependency ratios, it is useful
to look at total trade values, which I have presented below. 
[Graph 3: Total trade with region and rest of the world.]
Source: COMTRADE (2014).
This chart presents a different angle to the preceding ones. Here we can see total trade values (in
millions of dollars) for all the countries, broken into the APT trade and the rest of the world. Here
we see a much clearer pattern. All the countries show increasing values as the years go by. It can
also be seen that the three Northeast Asian countries have much higher values than the others. Also,
while the previous graphs showed a decrease in the ratios for 2010, we see that trade continued to
increase substantially for all the countries over the 2005 values. This indicates that while trade
increased quite a bit during that five year period, it did not increase as much as the GDP did.
Looking at this graph, we are presented with a theoretical problem. If it is our hypothesis
that the increased complexity of trade should lead to the creation of institutions to manage the
emerging problems the complexity brings about, should we ignore total trade volumes? After all,
while Malaysia and Singapore's dependency values far outstripped those of China and Japan, the
latter's trade totals were substantially higher than the former's. This could perhaps explain the
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difference in FTA creation rates. Malaysia and Singapore had both higher dependency ratios and
higher total trade than the other ASEAN countries, while also signing far more FTAs. Meanwhile,
the Northeast countries had lower dependency ratios, with far greater total trade. However, I do not
wish to argue that total trade is what ought to be considered, as that brings about other theoretical
problems. Total trade biases toward larger countries with more trade in general, as well as richer
countries. It does not indicate relative significance on its own. After all, if China has a high volume
of trade with a small country, giving low levels of dependence from China's perspective and high
from the smaller country, one ought not ignore that and treat the significance as the same, just
because the total trade is the same. From the perspective of China, trade with the smaller country
may be fairly inconsequential and not worth the effort it would take to manage the trade. For the
smaller country, they may be utterly dependent on China, and management may be much more
important. The issue though remains problematic. 
While I have discussed in some depth the individual differences in volume between the
countries, what needs to be discussed are the overall changes in dependency. After all, we are
considering a change in policy. Before 2000 only there were only a handful of FTAs signed by
Asian countries. We are still presented with the issue of why there was a change. Hence in the chart
below, I have presented the percentage changes between 1995 and 2010 in dependency ratios. Note
that the values from 2005 were mostly higher than the ones from 2010, so this decrease at the end is
still present in the percentage changes.
[Table 3: Dependency ratio changes from 1995 to 2010.]
Source: COMTRADE (2014); World Bank (2014).
If we look at the ASEAN-directed dependency ratios, we see that, aside from Singapore, all the
countries under this fifteen year period show an increase in dependency. And aside from Malaysia,
those increases are quite substantial. The Northeast Asian countries, which had very low levels of
dependency on the ASEAN countries, while still having low levels, have had very high increases –
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ASEAN Plus Three Rest of World
China 76.44 -16.75 43.59
Indonesia 91.75 -6.15 -23.04
Japan 64.27 258.68 52.19
Korea 76.44 116.84 58.25
Malaysia 0.57 -5.86 -23.63
Philippines 81.44 1.04 -34.79
Singapore -3.36 4.37 3.03
Thailand 81.29 59.90 46.45
both Korea and China show 76.44% increases in dependency. The two countries which showed no
substantial change – Malaysia and Singapore – were already at extremely high levels of integration,
which could indicate that at some point increased dependence may plateau.
Integration with the Northeast countries is less clear cut. This in itself is interesting. One
may hypothesize that countries in Asia have become more dependent on China, as China has risen
so meteorically. However this is not quite clear here. Most of the ASEAN countries, aside from
Thailand, are dependent on the Northeast Asian countries approximately as much as they were
fifteen years prior. However, Japan and Korea are much more dependent on the other respective
Northeast Asian countries than they were – Japan is an astounding 259 percent more dependent on
Korea and China than they were fifteen years earlier. One can assume that much of this change is
due to the meteoric rise of China during this period. And this is confirmed by my research. Japan's
dependence on China increases by 406.41 percent. In contrast, China has decreased its dependence
on Japan by 36.40 percent. Thus one can say of China that, while it has substantially increased its
trade with the ASEAN countries relative to its GDP, the same cannot be said of its relationship to
the Northeast Asian countries. 
With regard to dependence on the rest of the world, we see that all the countries aside from
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have increased their dependence. However, for both
Malaysia and the Philippines, the 2005 values would show an increase, and for Indonesia the value
is essentially unchanged. 
Thus, despite the arguments that interdependence has been mostly unchanged during this
period, we see that in fact dependence on both the region and the world has, in general, increased,
though the changes vary considerably between countries. While the Southeast Asian countries had
their FTA rates reflected by their dependency ratios, this was not the case with the Northeast Asian
countries. For them, the rates of dependency were in general lower than those of the Southeast
Asian countries, despite also signing many agreements. Moreover, while we do see large percentage
changes in dependency, it is unclear how one may interpret them if the initial levels are quite low.
For instance, Japan may have increased its dependency on the ASEAN countries by 64.27%, but
they started out at the low level of 0.02 (2%).
5.3 Intraindustry Trade
In this section I look at the different levels of intraindustry trade. Once again I track the changes
over a fifteen year period. It would be possible to look at the level of intra-industry trade for the
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whole region, but again, that would collapse the individual differences. I also show the different
levels between the APT region and the whole world. Unlike in the previous section, I am showing
just the graphs for the APT region (which includes both ASEAN and the North East Asian
countries) and the world.
[Graph 4: Intraindustry trade within the APT region.]
Source: COMTRADE (2014). Note: Unlike with the dependency values, the excluded ASEAN countries were not used
in these calculations, as their inclusion would be largely inconsequential due to comparatively low levels of trade and
similar intraindustry trade values.
This graph shows intraindustry trade levels for the eight countries with the APT region. Here we
can see that there is mostly an increasing trend over time, though again with many countries having
a drop-off in 2010. This indicates that countries are trading more similar products with each other
and are likely increasing their production integration. Singapore again has the highest levels of all
the countries, but this time with many other countries close in values. This makes sense when
considering what this indicator measures. Unlike the indicator used in the previous section, this one
is equal between partners. That is to say, if country X has a certain level of intraindustry trade with
country Y, country Y has the same level. The values are not based on separate individual
characteristics to the same degree, so the variation in the case of this region should be lower.
We can see again that China and Japan score comparatively low, with Indonesia joining
them, but unlike with the previous measure, Korea is among the highest, in fact, second highest.
While in general the Southeast Asian countries score higher, the difference is much more slight than
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the previous measure.
[Graph 5: Intraindustry trade with the rest of the world.]
Source: COMTRADE (2014).
This graph shows levels of intraindustry trade toward the rest of the world. In this case, Malaysia
and Singapore again score highest. Korea this time is significantly lower, and China is higher,
relative to the others, compared with the previous graph. Japan and Indonesia are at the bottom. For
several countries there seems to be an increase in intraindustry trade, but the pattern is not at all as
clear. And critical to note is that the levels of intraindustry trade are much lower than in the previous
graph. The difference, in percentage, can be seen here:
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[Table 4: Difference between regional and non-regional intraindustry trade.]
Source: COMTRADE (2014).
Here we can see that, aside from the Philippines,21 all countries have higher levels of intraindustry
trade at the regional level. This indicates that, if intraindustry trade is a good measure of
interdependence, and if interdependence leads to more institutions to manage that interdependence,
there will be more of an economic incentive for such institutionalization at the regional level. Aside
from the Philippines, the lowest difference is 13%. Both Korea and Japan though, have much higher
levels, with Korea having 71% higher levels of intraindustry trade at the regional rather than global
level. 
The graph below shows the changes from 1995 to 2010 in intraindustry trade at both the
regional and global levels. Again, as the 2010 levels were generally not the maximum, this chart is
conservative.
[Table 5: Intraindustry trade changes between 1995 and 2010.]
Source: COMTRADE (2014). Note: These are percentage changes, not percentage point changes.
Here we note a clear trend toward higher levels of intraindustry trade, with the most dramatic
21 I have reason to believe that the Philippines APT 2010 results are in error. There was a very large number of exports
classified as "Special transactions, commodity not classified according to class" (code 93) and zero imports under 
the same classification. This lack of classification of exports may be the reason for the strange results.
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APT World % Difference
China 0.54 0.46 18.50
Indonesia 0.44 0.38 16.08
Japan 0.49 0.33 47.38
Korea 0.72 0.42 71.38
Malaysia 0.73 0.65 13.18
Philippines 0.48 0.51 -4.81
Singapore 0.85 0.66 28.57
Thailand 0.65 0.48 34.41
APT Rest of World
China -0.47 1.19
Indonesia 49.66 15.80
Japan 25.09 -14.26
Korea 9.61 -4.40
Malaysia 30.53 19.17
Philippines -7.58 8.92
Singapore 14.25 10.84
Thailand 46.05 2.80
increases occurring on the regional level. There are two large decreases, Japan's world intraindustry
trade level, and Philippines regional change. Aside from those, we see many large increases across
the board and only minimal decreases in a few locations. If intraindustry trade is a factor in
institutional growth, we should see a growing emphasis being placed on regional institutions.
5.4 Inferential Statistics
The data prevented above show some possible evidence for a connection between economic
interdependence and the development of free trade agreements. However, it does not show that the
agreements are developed in order to solve coordination problems. In order to test that, I have
attempted to find whether or not there is a relationship between the degree of economic
interdependence and intraindustry between two countries who have signed an FTA and the
complexity of the free trade agreement they come to (measured by number of WTO-plus features in
the agreement). 
Presented below are five models for all of the bilateral FTAs in my set. Model 1 tests just the
mean measure of interdependence, model 2 tests just the "weak link" measure of interdependence,
model 3 tests just the measure of intraindustry trade, model 4 tests the mean measure of
interdependence and the measure of intraindustry trade, and model 5 tests the "weak link" measure
of interdependence combined with the measure of intraindustry trade. These are all done using a
poisson regression.
[Table 6: Poisson regressions for bilateral FTAs signed with all eight countries.]
N = 44 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
IRR Sig. IRR Sig. IRR Sig. IRR Sig. IRR Sig.
Mean Inter. 610.2 .210 14.75 .699
Weak Inter. 172425 .487 .171 .933
Intraind. tr. 1.77 .145 1.55 .405 1.813 .205
GOF (Pearson .724 .729 .709 .731 .725
Chi-Square)
As can be seen, none of the five models show any statistically significant variables.22 This would
seem to suggest that the three measures I have selected do not lead to the construction of more
22 How to interpret the coefficients, here represented as Incident Rate Ratios (IRR), as well as the Goodness of Fit 
measurement, the Pearson Chi-Square, will be discussed later in this section.
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complex FTAs, developed to manage more complex trading relationships and solve more complex
problems. I think, however, that this interpretation is, at least partially, incorrect. As can be seen
from the chart I developed (Appendix 1), the FTAs signed by the three “plus three” countries,
demonstrate very little variability in how many WTO-plus elements are present. Almost all of them
have between four and six. However, the FTAs signed by the ASEAN countries seem to show much
greater variability. Moreover, the previous two sections of this paper has shown that while in
general all countries have increased dependency and intraindustry trade during the period in
question, only among the ASEAN countries do we see the most interdependent countries (measured
through both dependency ratios and intraindustry trade ratios) having the highest number of FTAs.
This relationship did not extend to the Northeast Asian countries. They showed low levels of
interdependence paired with high levels of FTA creation. Thus, it may be worth breaking this data
into Northeast Asian FTAs and Southeast Asian countries, in order to see if a differing relationship
applies. Some may argue here that such a split is inappropriate, perhaps that I am selecting on the
dependent variable. However, I assert that such a split is justified due to the strong differences
between the two groups of countries on these measures, as well as the conceptual understanding that
they are in very different positions and are likely to follow different strategies.23
In order to begin to examine if there is a difference in the relationships, I created scatterplots
for both the Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, for both measures, plotted against number of
FTA provisions.
[Graph 6: Scatterplots of FTA provisions against mean interdependence. Northeast countries (left)
and Southeast countries (right).]
23 There is a question then of what to do about FTAs signed between Northeast and Southeast Asian countries. I have 
decided to count them under both sets, mainly due to a lack of observations.
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Shown above are plots of the mean interdependency against number of WTO-plus elements.24 Right
away a difference can be seen. In the Northeast Asian countries, there appears to be no relationship.
Aside from only three cases, all the FTAs have four through six features, despite a large difference
in interdependence. However, it could still be possible that a relationship persisted if we saw a trend
within those three values – however none is present. In fact, we seem to see a cluster of many
values in the upper left corner, indicating low interdependence and high FTA complexity. In
contrast, the Southeast Asian country FTAs show what seems to be a clear pattern. As the
relationships get more complex, the number of complex features in the FTAs increase. There are
some outliers, but the relationship seems quite clear.
Now we can examine plots created with measures of intraindustry trade, to see if the same
pattern (or difference of pattern) is present. 
[Graph 7: Scatterplots of FTA provisions against intraindustry trade. Northeast countries (left) and
Southeast countries (right).]
In these two plots a similar pattern emerges. For the Northeast Asian countries there is again no
apparent relationship, however with less clustering in the top left corner. For the Southeast Asian
countries, there is again a fairly clear pattern, more intraindustry trade is associated with more
complex FTAs, though perhaps this pattern is slightly less obvious than with the previous measure. 
In order to test these patterns for the Southeast Asian countries, a Poisson regression was
again employed, using the same models, and the results are presented below.
24 I have chosen here to not show the weak versions of interdependency, however, the results are quite similar.
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[Table 7: Poisson regression for bilateral FTAs signed with Southeast countries.]
N = 25 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
IRR Sig. IRR Sig. IRR Sig. IRR Sig. IRR Sig.
Mean Inter.       2848895    .017             1222.88 .427
Weak Inter.           1.970E+17   .058            4602885 .567
Intraind. Tr. 4.161 .008 2.753 .169 3.368 .059
GOF (Pearson .606 .691 .569 .575 .593
Chi-Square)
 
Here we confirm that, alone, all three measures show statistically significant values. If we look at
model 4 we see no significant values, however the significance of intraindustry trade is far greater
than with mean interdependence. Model 5 shows intraindustry trade significant at the .1 level, with
the weak measure of interdependence not at all significant. The correlation between intraindustry
trade and interdependence is much higher for the mean version of interdependence than the weak
version, at .679, compared to .515, which could explain why intraindustry trade remained
significant only in the model with the weak variant. The same trend is present in model 4 as well,
and I would argue that the insignificance there of intraindustry trade should not necessarily be
trusted. 
The number of observations (25) is low and the model does not appear to be a very strong
fit. All five of these models show signs of underdispersion. Poisson distributions make the
assumption that the mean will be equal to the variance. In these cases, we see that the true variance
is smaller than the mean, resulting in Pearson chi-square value/df ratios much less than 1 - which is
the expectation. This underdispersion would result in an overestimation of standard errors, thus
underestimating the significance of the independent variables (Kennedy 2008:246). However, it is
impossible to conclude without adjusting the model exactly what the effect would be. 
One may wonder how we can interpret the coefficients in these models. This is actually
quite difficult to do. I have exponentiated the coefficients, so that the numbers we have are
incidence rate ratios (IRR).25 If we first look at model 1, the IRR for the interdependence measure is
2848894.78 (including the decimals). That means moving from 0% mean interdependence to 100%
mean interdependence would correspond to a 284889378% expected increase in the number of
WTO-plus provisions. While that is an inconceivably large increase, it is critical to point out that the
highest level of mean interdependence out of all of these country pairs is 5.63%, which was
25 For a detailed explanation on how to interpret incidence rate ratios for count models, for different types of 
independent variables see (Hilbe 2008).
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between China and Singapore in 2008. If we calculate 2848894.78^(1/100), we get 1.16, which
indicates that to increase interdependence by 1% results in a 16% expected increase in the number
of features. If we look at intraindustry trade in model 5, we see that the IRR is 3.37, which
corresponds to a 237% expected increase in provisions if we move from 0% intraindustry trade to
100% intraindustry trade. By calculating 3.37^(1/10), we get 1.13. This means that a 10% increase
in intraindustry trade results in a 13% expected increase in these provisions.
Before this section is concluded, one concern must be addressed. As indicated in the
previous research section, there is evidence that over time the FTAs have become more complex,
with more coverage. I also demonstrated in this chapter that there has been a general tendency
during this period for these measures to increase – thus, what I could be picking up is just the effect
of time. This would imply that the individual FTAs being tested here are showing a relationship to
the measures of interdependence due to fact that those measures are correlated with the year – and
something else is actually related to their growing complexity – perhaps some form of institutional
learning, or an ideational shift in what FTAs should do. So to test that I have below a scatterplot of 
the FTAs against the year.
 [Graph 8: Scatterplot of FTA provisions against year signed for Southeast Asian countries.]
As can be seen, there does not at all appear to be a connection between later FTAs demonstrating
more complexity. In fact, there appears to be a trend in the opposite direction. This was later
confirmed by a regression, which showed a significance of .032 and an exponentiated beta of .927 –
thus indicating an expected 7.3% decrease in WTO-plus features with each yearly increase. This
confirms that the relationships shown above act independently of the year. Moreover, it raises the
question of why I am showing a decrease in FTA complexity with time, while Kawai and Wignaraja
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(2013) showed the opposite. There are two possibilities. Either this relationship above would not
persist if all FTAs were included, including the multilateral ones, or that this is a result of the
methodological choices in how to count WTO-features, as discussed in the methodological section.
It is important to point out that their analysis, showing the increase, did not break down the actual
complexity of WTO-plus agreements, but instead classified the agreements on a binary scale. Thus,
it is possible that all or most of these would be considered WTO-plus, to them. Moreover, the fact
that almost all the Northeast Asian countries' FTAs would be considered high on my scale of
complexity would indicate that it is likely all of them would at least be considered as WTO-plus to
them. Thus, the issue can perhaps be reduced to the fact that we are measuring different things. As
to why there is a statistically significant decrease here, that could perhaps be due to the possibility
that FTAs which are more crucial, and more economically motivated were signed first.
5.5 Discussion
Unlike Ravenhill (2010), by tying trade to GDP, we mostly see large increases in dependence both
towards the region and the rest of the world. This pattern is present especially if we look between
1995 and 2005. A similar increase is present for intraindustry trade, both toward the region and the
rest of the world, with larger increases happening at the regional level. These large increases can be,
unfortunately, difficult to interpret if the original levels are already quite low. 
The major benefit to using these individualized measures is that the different rates of FTA
creation can be compared to the different levels in these measures. There we see that Singapore and
Malaysia, which have very high levels of FTA creation, also have high levels of dependence and
intraindustry trade. The Northeast Asian countries meanwhile have high levels of FTAs, with
relatively low levels of dependence and intraindustry trade. A pattern possibly emerges in which
within the ASEAN countries, high levels of dependence and intraindustry trade corresponds to
higher FTA creation rates, whereas this does not extend to the Northeast countries. 
This division was further found when looking at the complexity of the FTAs, and whether
interdependence of intraindustry trade can act as predictors of that complexity. There we see that
there is no relationship present at all among the Northeast countries. In fact, it seems as though they
have the tendency to include many provisions in their FTAs as routine. For the ASEAN countries,
we see a greater variability in the number of provisions in their FTAs, and we see that intraindustry
trade acts as a statistically significant predictor. As I discussed in the methodology section, the
system by which provisions are counted is likely to have a large effect. If the system were more
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strict, it could end up that the Northeast countries would demonstrate the same relationship. It is
possible their FTAs have much greater coverage within the text, despite lacking the intention to
actually utilize these provisions. 
The fact that the statistically significant relationship between interdependence and
provisions disappeared when intraindustry trade was brought in, for the Southeast countries, is very
interesting.26 The difference between the measures may in fact reflect the predictions of neoliberal
institutionalist theory. The theory would predict that institutions are developed to manage collective
action problems, which emerge due to complex relationships between countries (Stein 2008; Hurrell
1995; Keohane 1984). While Keohane and Nye (2012) stated that these problems may emerge due
to interdependence, it is likely that interdependence itself is not the cause. This could explain the
results from the Southeast Asian regression. Alone, increases in interdependence (and it did not
matter whether it was the weak link version or the mean version) were correlated with more
comprehensive FTAs. However, once controlling for intraindustry trade, that relationship
disappeared. Thus, the relationship was not actually between interdependence and
comprehensiveness, but we can hypothesize that it was instead likely that increases in
interdependence were correlated with increases in intraindustry trade, which was in fact the true
predictor of the provisions. 
If more accurate measures are to be found, perhaps it is best to move away from
interdependence, and more toward indicators which actually measure the problems themselves.
Interdependence may increase these problems, but it is also likely that they can emerge in situations
with low levels of interdependence, and situations may exist in which high levels of
interdependence are largely absent the problems which institutionalization is meant to solve. This
issue may explain the higher levels of FTAs among Northeast Asian countries. While they have
lower levels of interdependence and intraindustry trade, they have much higher trade levels in total -
which could make problems more likely to emerge. However, that is merely a possibility, and
nothing in my study can indicate that such a situation is actually the case. 
The division between Northeast and Southeast countries may, on the contrary, point to other
concerns behind FTA creation, perhaps especially present among the Northeast countries. Asia has
been described as "realist" and the competition between especially Japan and China has been
stressed (Corning 2011). This could be part of the reason for the difference in my results between
Northeast and Southeast Asia. This competition could explain an extra likeliness to sign FTAs on
their part, even if not economically necessary, as well as a reluctance to sign one with each other,
26 It is possible that interdependence could retain its significance in a better fitting model. This cannot be completely 
discounted.
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despite very high levels of complex trade. Hence, I could say that this study has found some
evidence for the neoliberal institutionalist argument, but also evidence that it is not the complete
story. 
What do these results say with regard to regionalism? We see that there are, in general, fairly
large increases in both dependency and intraindustry trade toward the region, from both the ASEAN
countries as well as among the Northeast countries. We also see that intraindustry trade, which for
the ASEAN countries was shown the be a statistically significant predictor of FTA complexity, is
significantly higher for the regional measures than for the global ones. This is a relationship which
was not found for the dependency values. Thus, if intraindustry trade plays a role in FTA creation or
FTA complexity, we may expect more comprehensive institutional coverage within the region than
outside of it. The growth of FTAs with non-regional partners may be a continuation of "open
regionalism" (Bergsten 1997) which may still operate within Asia, or it may be a form of
regionalism which is a response to globalization (Moon 2011). Asia's development has been largely
export-led (Park 2002), and we can see that throughout the period of this study, Asian countries
increased their trade dependence on the rest of the world as well as increased the degree in which
that trade is intraindustry - which may signify a more complex form of trade. Therefore, even if
there is a higher need to form regional institutions (due to higher levels of intraindustry trade), there
has also been present an increasing need for those institutions outside of the region as well.
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6 Conclusion
The explosion of FTAs in Asia since 2000 has prompted much speculation. However, there have
been very few studies which have directly evaluated the neoliberal institutionalist argument, that
they were created to help manage growing trade complexities and problems. Moreover, whether the
economic argument was accepted or not, the regional nature of the FTAs was stressed. What this
study has attempted to do is to utilize a measure of interdependence which is not zero-sum, as one
based on trade-shares is, and a measure of intraindustry trade, to see how trade complexity and
interdependence has changed over a fifteen year period, both within the Asian region, and between
Asian and non-Asian trading partners. Moreover, I have used these measures as potential predictors
for FTA comprehensiveness. 
The major findings of this study have been that dependency on and intraindustry trade with
both the region and the world has generally increased. Based on comparative levels between the
countries, the Southeast Asian countries have their FTA numbers reflected by their intraindustry
trade and dependency values, but the Northeast Asian countries, with low levels of intraindustry
trade and dependency have signed more FTAs than would be predicted (if this relationship is to
hold across the region). Moreover, a similar split was found concerning FTA comprehensiveness.
The Northeast countries have very comprehensive agreements, regardless of how complex the
trading relationship is. The Southeast countries, on the contrary, demonstrate that intraindustry trade
is a statistically significant predictor of FTA comprehensiveness. This is a fairly strong finding in
favor of the neoliberal institutionalist argument. However, the division between Northeast and
Southeast countries could be problematic for the theory. The success of this methodology for the
Southeast countries indicates it could be a useful method for future use. The finding that
intraindustry trade is significant but interdependence is not, when used in the same equation
together, points toward how better measures can be developed in the future - by focusing
specifically on the problems, and not interdependence.
This study has hopefully contributed to our knowledge of FTA growth within the Asian
sphere. There has been a dearth of research into the possible 'functional' nature of FTAs, but this
study shows that there appears to be some evidence that it is a factor. Moreover, FTA creation has
remained understudied on a global level, and so this study can perhaps add to our knowledge of
FTA creation generally. Mostly, I hope that this study has contributed through its methodological
considerations. The problematic nature of using trade-shares as a potential predictor of FTA growth
ought not be understated. As this phenomenon encompasses both Asian partners as well as non-
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Asian ones, using trade-shares is hard to justify. Moreover, the success in quantifying FTA
comprehensiveness and using it within a regression can be applied more thoroughly and generally,
and can become a strong tool to better analyze the reasons for FTA creation. 
There are many areas for future research which ought to be considered. Better indicators can
be developed to more accurately assess the degree in which trade has led to problems which require
institutionalization to manage. Assessing the comprehensiveness of the FTAs can be repeated with
more detailed and strict procedures. This method moreover, can be applied to other regions, or even
to different issue areas. The division found between Northeast and Southeast countries can also be
studied in much greater detail. Furthermore, as was discussed in the methodological chapter, this
study is purely correlational in nature, and cannot say anything of causal mechanisms. Thus, there is
still a great need to study those mechanism within Asia. If the private sector has not pushed for the
establishment of FTAs, why were they developed? Who are the major actors? Studying those
questions can provide great clues to the possibilities of further institutionalization and regional
development. These findings can both help us understand the Asian region better, as well as develop
theories which, while originally focused on Europe, can be of great use around the world, if the
non-European experiences are factored in. 
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Bilateral FTA Agreement Year Signed
W
TO
+ Intellectual P
roperty
E
nvironm
ent
Labor st. / M
ovem
ent
E
ducation / H
R
D
Investm
ent
G
overnm
ent P
rocurem
ent Total
Brunei – Japan 2007 4
China – Iceland 2013 5
China – Switzerland 2013 4
China – New Zealand 2008 4
China – Chile 2005 5
China – Costa Rica 2010 4
China – Pakistan 2006 1
China – Peru 2009 5
China – Singapore 2008 3
Indonesia – Pakistan 2012 0
Indonesia – Japan 2007 5
Japan – Chile 2007 5
Japan – India 2011 5
Japan – Malaysia 2005 4
Japan – Mexico 2004 6
Japan – Peru 2011 4
Japan – Philippines 2006 5
Japan – Singapore 2002 5
Japan – Switzerland 2009 5
Japan – Thailand 2007 5
Japan – Vietnam 2008 4
Korea – Colombia 2013 6
Korea – India 2009 5
Korea – Chile 2003 5
Korea – Peru 2011 6
Korea – Singapore 2005 6
Korea – Turkey 2012 0
Korea – USA 2007 5
Malaysia – Australia 2012 3
Malaysia – Chile 2010 1
Malaysia – India 2011 2
Malaysia – New Zealand 2009 3
Malaysia – Pakistan 2007 3
Singapore – India 2005 4
Singapore – New Zealand 2000 3
Singapore – Australia 2003 5
Singapore – Costa Rica 2010 4
Singapore – Jordan 2004 1
Singapore – Panama 2006 3
Singapore – Peru 2008 3
Singapore – USA 2003 5
Thailand – Australia 2004 4
Thailand – New Zealand 2005 3
Thailand – Peru 2010 0
